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We promote awareness of the features of emails that propose advanced fee 
fraud schemes. These are commonly known as  419 emails (after Section 419 of 
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incidence of first person singular pronouns is seven times greater in 419 emails 
than non-419 emails. We suggest elements of a future research agenda that can 
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1. Introduction
Fraud is a misstatement or false representation that is intended to deceive for personal
(usually financial) advantage (Action Fraud, 2010). Advance Fee Fraud (AFF) is the most 
frequently encountered and successful type of fraud in history (Ofulue, 2010; Garrett, 2014). 
AFF involves a request for advance fees or upfront payments by a dishonest person from a 
victim, for resources, goods or services that never materialize (Action Fraud, 2010; FBI, 
2010; Ultrascan AGI, 2014). AFF schemes commonly employ two or more other kinds of 
fraud (such as impersonation fraud, identity theft, and/or phishing) (Edelson, 2003).  
In this research note, we focus on a specific kind of AFF, known widely as 419 fraud. 
This type of fraud is claimed to be “one of the longest running, most successful, omnipresent 
[and] transnational [frauds] … in history” (Ultrascan AGI, 2014; p.16). 419 fraud involves:  
… scheme(s) designed by fraudsters purporting to have lucrative but bogus business, humanitarian or 
philanthropic related deals where the victim is promised large sums of money for no initial investment.… 
[and]… is persuaded to advance some cash to the scammer for a variety of purposes such as the payment 
of unanticipated taxes, duty fees and outright bribery. The victim will later discover that there is no fortune 
to be retrieved or business to profit from, as the scammer disappears with the advance fee he or she had 
collected (Onyebadi & Park, 2012, p. 182) 
Attempts to perpetrate this particular type of fraud are regularly experienced by many 
members of society, including accountants and their clients. Indeed, typically, government 
regulatory agencies throughout the world advise persons who are suspicious of any email 
from a stranger seeking upfront payment of funds to seek advice from “an accountant or 





The research note that follows should be particularly beneficial in raising the 
consciousness and understanding of those with interests in forensic accounting, especially 
fraud detection. Our aim is to provide a portrait of 419 fraud and to draw on that portrait to 
offer some preliminary insight to how 419 fraud can be detected. We introduce the prospect 
that the computer aided text analysis software, DICTION, can assist in the detection of 419 
fraud. We do not canvass the theoretical underpinnings of fraud. For an understanding of this, 
see, for example, Choo and Tan (2007) and Schuchter and Levi (2015). 
The term 419 fraud originated in Nigeria and is derived from Section 419 of the Nigerian 
Penal Code that deals with false pretences (Nykodym & Taylor, 2004; Oriola, 2005; Salu, 
2005). The term is used widely in international parlance to describe various fraudulent 
schemes perpetrated within or outside Nigeria (Adogame, 2009; Chawki, 2009). 419 fraud 
has flourished for many decades and has defrauded thousands of “curious, naïve, and/or 
sympathetic” victims (individuals and companies) of cash and other assets — sometimes 
resulting in tragic mental health deterioration or even suicide (Glickman, 2005, p. 463). The 
extent of the monetary losses resulting from 419 fraud has been estimated by Ultrascan AGI 
(Advanced Global Investigation). This is an international consulting firm comprising “51 
partners managing 3284 experts in 69 countries” which focuses on anti-money laundering 
and transnational organized crime (http://www.ultrascan-
agi.com/public_html/html/about.html). According to Ultrascan AGI, by 2013 over $US 82 
billion had been lost to 419 Advanced Fee Fraud, with $US 12.7 billion lost in 2013 (“419 
Advance Fee Fraud Statistics 2013”, http://www.ultrascan-
agi.com/public_html/html/419_statistics.html). A recent case of AFF involved “a lonely 
[English] beancounter” who was jailed after “ he fell for … a classic Nigerian email scam, 
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and conned £150,000 out of a friend so he could bankroll his fake damsel in distress” 
(Martin, 2016). 
Much legislation has been passed, especially in Nigeria, to curb 419 fraud, but without 
success. Media education campaigns have encouraged the adoption of procedures (including 
recourse to the advice of accountants) to protect proprietary information and to lead to safer 
and more disciplined use of computers and the Internet. Several scam-baiting sites have also 
been developed, such as 419eater (http://www.419eater.com/). Despite such efforts, there has 
been a strong increase in the perpetrators, victims, and losses from 419 fraud. Nonetheless, 
the level of successful convictions of perpetrators has been low (Oriola, 2005). This is largely 
due to the difficulty in building a case against perpetrators because of technical aspects of the 
fraud (The Herald, 2017). 
419 scammers (known as 419ers) are adept at evading legal counter measures (Ultrascan 
AGI, 2014). Attempts to defeat them with traditional legal instruments have been inadequate 
due to the transnational nature of the fraud (Webster & Drew, 2017). The Internet has 
facilitated the activities of 419ers because it offers a wider geographical coverage, access to a 
large number of potential victims at a low-cost and low-risk, new and readily available 
scamming opportunities, anonymity and concealment of identity through minimal physical 
contact (Blommaert & Omoniyi, 2006; Hutchings & Hayes, 2009; Ofulue, 2010; Webster & 
Drew, 2017). Dion (2010, p. 630) concluded that 419ers regard the Internet as an “Eldorado” 
because of the “quasi absence of the rule of law.” The failure of previous efforts to curb 419 
fraud prompted Holt and Graves (2007) and Herley (2012) to argue for the development of 
automated scam filter detection systems based on an understanding of how 419ers think, and 
how their victims react.  
In a forensic accounting context, the power of linguistic and psycholinguistics analysis 
techniques to understand the human behaviour reflected in fraud has been studied widely (see 
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Nicolaides, Trafford, & Craig, 2017). Linguistic analysis techniques have been used to 
investigate behaviour associated with corporate fraud through study of CEO letters to 
shareholders, conference calls with financial analysts, and earnings press releases. These 
investigations have found some significant linguistic indicators of deception (Humphreys et 
al., 2011; Craig, Mortensen & Iyer, 2013; Purda & Skillicorn, 2015). Nonetheless, with 
respect to 419 fraud, linguistic analysis is less developed, despite its strong potential for 
success (Ofulue, 2010; Carter, 2015). If 419 fraud can be reduced considerably, it is claimed 
that this would help curtail undesirable associated activities such as money laundering, 
organized crime, corruption, and terrorism (Ultrascan AGI, 2014).  
Here we conduct a preliminary exploration of how linguistic analysis techniques 
(including those involving the use of computer assisted text analysis) can be helpful in 
identifying a distinctive marker of 419 emails. We are motivated by the promptings of Holt 
and Graves (2007), Herley (2012) and Lamberger, Dobovšek and Slak (2013) to improve the 
rate of detection. In particular, we conduct a preliminary investigation of a sample of 419 
emails and non-419 emails using a linguistic cue that has been associated with deceptive 
conduct in written text: a high rate of use of first person singular pronouns. Thus, we address 
the following specific research question: 
Is the incidence of first person singular pronouns substantially higher in 419 emails than 
in non-419 emails? 
The central purpose is simply to draw attention to the importance of linguistic analysis 
techniques (particularly pronoun use) in helping to identify fraud. In doing so, we contribute 
to the accounting literature by introducing a wide variety of research on email fraud that has 
been published in other disciplines, such as in communications, social psychology, 
criminology, law and ethics. We propose some elements of a future research agenda. 
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Section 2 reviews literature on the nature of 419 emails, how 419 fraud is perpetrated, 
and outlines some studies of language use that have investigated whether pronouns are 
indicators of deception. Section 3 describes the research method. Section 4 presents results. 
Section 5 enters conclusions and offers suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 The nature of 419 fraud 
419ers use techniques that distort recipients’ rational thought processes, and command a 
shift in behaviour by them (Freiermuth, 2011a; 2011b). These techniques are implicit in the 
structure and style of 419 emails, where every word and sentence has a planned purpose 
(Ofulue, 2010; Freiermuth, 2011a; 2011b; Carter, 2015).  
Scammers often obtain names and addresses of potential victims from trade journals, 
professional and commercial directories, lists in URLs and newspapers (Glickman, 2005). 
Some studies suggest the preferred type of victim is an educated citizen (Lamberger et al., 
2013; Ultracsan AGI, 2014) while others contend that scammers prefer to target people who 
are elderly, vulnerable or uneducated (Blommaert & Omoniyi, 2006), or who are greedy and 
complicit, or greedy and charitable (Freiermuth, 2011b). 
Scammers often enlist a high level of technological and cultural competence to reflect 
the current reality of the countries and persons with whom they interact (Blommaert & 
Omoniyi, 2006). They often include attachments to enhance the veracity of their emails 
(Glickman, 2005). They discuss details of the scam offer, and the role of the scammer and 
victim, in ways that are specifically intended to be compelling to recipients (Carter, 2015). 
Scammers often assume the names and designations of prominent people, such as 
government officials, royalty, or wealthy business moguls (Glickman, 2005; Salu, 2005; FBI, 
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2010). They mix English and African names to persuade recipients to think they are 
“educated, upscale” individuals in their native country (Lamberger et al., 2013, p. 222). 
Most 419 emails contain grammatical errors and structural flaws that seem unbefitting to 
the identities scammers assume (Blommaert & Omoniyi, 2006). Many contain long 
convoluted sentences, all uppercase writing, non-standard punctuation, and misspellings 
(Blommaert & Omoniyi, 2006; Ofulue 2010; Freiermuth, 2011b). Some observers claim this 
is done deliberately to portray the stereotype that foreigners have of Africans (and Nigerians 
in particular) of being “childlike, intellectually unsophisticated, innocent in business ways, 
and corrupt” (Glickman, 2005, p. 464). The effect is that many recipients bask in an illusion 
of intellectual superiority, rendering them over-confident, and less suspicious (Glickman, 
2005). Invariably, scam emails seek to achieve credibility, portray urgency, and implore 
secrecy (Carter, 2015). An example of a 419 email (a business proposal) from Ultrascan AGI 
(2014). is reproduced in Appendix A. Note that the author cheekily uses the name “Dr. Kemy 
Kazy” – euphony for “kamikaze”? For other examples see Blommaert and Omoniyi (2006) 
and Onyebadi and Park (2012). 
2.2 Structure of a 419 email 
419 emails have the following rhetorical sequence at least 30% of the time: opening 
salutation; personal/professional credentials; offer solicitation; tale; trust statement; historical 
credentials; offer details; confidentiality plea; urgency statement; invitation for further 
contact; polite ending; and closing salutation (Freiermuth, 2011b, p. 224). Carter (2015, p.11) 
observed that this structure helped to “… inform, persuade, convey credibility, demand 
urgency, and secrecy, and provide re-assurances of legitimacy in ways that address the 
individualized and localized requirements and concerns of the recipient.” 419 scammers have 
found the above structure to be effective in “building solidarity” with email recipients and 
distorting their rational decision-making processes (Freiermuth, 2011a, p. 123). 
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Typically, the introduction to 419 emails are “narratives of trust” featuring an endearing 
or religious generic opening salutation (Dear Friend, Beneficiary, Asalam Alaekum (peace be 
with you)) (Ofulue, 2010). Often, to quell any doubts a recipient might have, there follows a 
brief mention of how the sender obtained the recipient’s address. This is followed by a 
statement of purpose for writing (Freiermuth, 2011a). Scammers are predisposed to 
“anticipate a recipient’s skepticisms and allay them” (Carter, 2015, p. 2). Ultimately, the 
recipient is persuaded to believe that s/he is lucky enough to be “the chosen one.” Such 
flattery is intended to lower the recipient’s guard and achieve success (Freiermuth, 2011a, b; 
Carter, 2015). 
The body of the email aims to develop credibility, intimacy and trust. Often there is a 
narrative outlining a tale of misfortune and an invitation for recipients to engage with the 
scammer to secure some promised future fortune. The cultivation of an air of intimacy is a 
high priority. Scammers “reveal personal information, and appear vulnerable or flawed,” 
giving “an impression of honesty, transparency and truthfulness” (Carter, 2015, p. 2). This 
encourages recipients to return the favour and mirror the sender’s kind gestures. The email 
concludes by reiterating that the main service or product in question is a scarce commodity. 
The recipient is urged to act quickly and is implored to keep in further contact (Freiermuth, 
2011a).  
2.3 Deception detection in 419 fraud 
Victims of 419 fraud are deceived by misstatements or outright omissions of genuine 
facts. They form a false illusion of reality and this results in them incurring pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary losses. Chawki (2009) and Onyebadi and Park (2012) claim that 419ers frame 
the discourse of their email deceptively to limit the potential victim’s perception of the 
situation. The vulnerability of some victims is exacerbated by their gullibility and poor ability 
to detect lies and deceit. Thus, their capacity to differentiate between a scam email and a 
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legitimate e-mail is limited (Kraut, 1980; Bond & DePaulo, 2006). In a study by Datar, Cole, 
and Rogers (2014), 163 respondents were presented with four emails (two scam, two 
legitimate), but only 1.7% correctly identified all four emails, and only 64.5% correctly 
identified three of the four. 
The intermediaries between senders and recipients of fraudulent emails (Internet nodes 
and networks) afford little control over the activities of scammers, other than mainly through 
email spam filters. Increasingly, recipients are unable to detect fraudulent emails because the 
Internet has made it easier for scammers to cut and paste legitimate logos and other data (of 
known and widely dispersed companies) to their emails (Lamberger et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, structural and linguistic errors in most 419 emails have been found to offer 
ineffective signals of likely deception (Blommaert & Omoniyi, 2006). 
Websites of government authorities, professions and businesses contain alerts which 
highlight the incidence and features of scam emails and other forms of fraudulent 
correspondence. Most attempts to promote awareness involve warning recipients not to 
provide confidential information via email, not to pay advance fees in online transactions, 
and not to engage lightly with any correspondence containing even fleeting mention of 
Nigeria or Africa (Datar et al., 2014). Despite strong and unambiguous warnings, and 
regulatory and preventive counter-actions taken locally and internationally, AFF scams have 
prospered through unsolicited emails in the Internet era (Adogame, 2009; Onyebadi & Park, 
2012; Holt & Graves, 2007).  
Spam filters have had only limited success in reducing the number of AFF emails that 
reach addressees (Lamberger et al., 2013). Information technology consultants Tiger 
Technologies claim that AFF spam is one of “the most difficult types for a spam filter to 
block.” Website spam filters are often based on the words in subject lines (Edelson, 2003; 
Ofulue, 2010), such as “URGENT REPLY NEEDED.” Nonetheless, spam filters have been 
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more successful, on average, than human intuition. This lends support to argument that 
improving the efficiency of spam filters by incorporating knowledge of linguistic cues and 
semantic features of fraudulent emails should be given priority over attempts to hone the 
detective skills of potential victims (Herley, 2012). Here we highlight the potential to develop 
spam filtering parameters based on the use of first person singular pronouns. 
2.4 Pronoun use in 419 emails 
Language use is crucial in understanding the psychology of the human mind and the 
cognitive processes embedded in the language choice of individuals (Pennebaker, Mehl, & 
Niederhoffer, 2003). Several studies have concluded that deceptive individuals are adept at 
manipulating language to achieve credibility and success with their fraudulent schemes 
(Blommaert & Omoniyi, 2006; Onyebadi & Park, 2012; Carter, 2015). Nonetheless, few 
studies of 419 emails have delved into the ramifications of the language used (exceptions 
include Blommaert & Omoniyi, 2006; Ofulue, 2010; Freiermuth, 2011a; Onyebadi & Park, 
2012). Holt and Graves (2007) pointed to scammers’ use of unique words and phrases such as 
“risk-free”, “urgent”, “confidential” and references to monetary activities. However, despite 
such peculiar word markers occurring consistently in 419 emails, few studies have identified 
specific language cues that have strong ability to detect 419 emails. 
Commonly, 419ers adopt language that appeals to religion, sympathy or pity; flatters 
personalities; and creates illusions of intimacy, urgency and sincerity (Glickman, 2005; 
Lamberger et al., 2013). Of particular interest to us is the potential for use of personal 
pronouns to create a sense of intimacy with recipients, and thereby, help allay their doubts 
(Carter, 2015). We contend that writers of 419 emails attempt to create an air of intimacy and 
familiarity with recipients through extensive use of first person singular pronouns (that is, by 
means of self-references, such as “I, me, my, mine, myself”). These first person singular 
pronouns have been associated with deceptive communication (Gupta and Skillicorn (2006); 
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Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, and Richards (2003)). Their use declares an individual’s 
ownership of a statement and is tantamount to a projection of honesty (Vartapetiance & 
Gillam, 2012).  
Decreased use of self-reference first person singular pronouns and increased use of 
collective first person plural pronouns (“we, us, our, ours, ourselves”) is reported to be a 
blame-shifting or disassociation strategy to help deceptive individuals distance themselves 
from the deceptions in their statements and to shift responsibility from themselves to others 
(Gupta and Skillicorn, 2006; Craig et al., 2013. See also Pennebaker et al., 2003; Zhou, 
Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Twitchell, 2004). Because 419ers are not usually involved in any 
disassociation or blame-shifting strategies, we do not explore pronoun use related to those 
strategies. 
 
3. Research Method  
Our preliminary study was based on a sample comprising thirty 419 emails and thirty 
non-419 emails. To reduce potential selection bias, the 419 emails were chosen from among 
the first 50 emails in the Ultrascan AGI database of 419 emails. They were classified 
according to content, with a view to ensuring fair representation of the major varieties of 419 
emails (Blommaert & Omoniyi, 2006; Ofulue, 2010). Following classification, a close-
reading analysis identified and eliminated twenty emails which duplicated content with little 
or no modification. The resulting sample of thirty 419 emails fell into the categories listed in 
the extreme left hand column of Table 1 and comprised 10,880 words (mean = 360 words; 
range from 68 to 723 words).  
The non-419 emails were chosen randomly from the email inbox of the first author and 
several of her colleagues. The fifth column of Table 1 shows the categories of the resultant 
sample of thirty non-419 emails. This sample comprised 6356 words (mean = 227 words; 
range from 49 to 998 words). We did not select the non-419 email sample to match the exact 
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content categories identified in the sample of 419 emails. This is consistent with Chang 
(2014) and findings that any matching the two sets of emails in terms of content does not 
significantly affect ability to correctly classify an email as deceptive or non-deceptive. 
 Table 1 
Analysis of Email Samples by Category 
419 emails Non-419 emails 
Category No % 
Mean 




Accounts 4 13 482 
Sales Letter 5 17 329 
Job Offers 9 30 328 
Offers 4 13 329 
Lottery wins 3 10 364 
Student 
Notifications 
6 20 194 
Settlements & 
Compensations 4 13 304 
Feedback 
Requests 
2 7 152 
Foreign 
Investment 
6 20 329 
Invitations 
2 7 93 
Humanitarian & 
Charity 
3 10 417 
Membership 
Notifications 
8 27 297 
Other 
1 4 399 
Other 
3 10 75 
 Total  30 
    
 Total  30 
    
 
We then used two methods to search the samples for linguistic cues that would enable 
discrimination between 419 emails and non-419 emails. First, we used the search facility of 
Microsoft WORD to tally the number of first-person singular pronouns (I, I’d, I’ll, me, mine, 
my, myself) and first-person plural pronouns (we, we’ll, we’ve, us, our, ours, ourselves) in 
both groups of emails. To capture the extent to which there is a collective (rather than 
individual) apportionment of responsibility in the emails, we also calculated “the percentage 
of all first-person pronouns that are singular,” consistent with Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007, p. 364). This more expansive approach offers a stronger view of pronoun use. 
Second, we used the computer-assisted text analysis software programme DICTION 7.0 
to identify the potential for first person singular pronouns to provide linguistic cues to 
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deception. Readers unfamiliar with DICTION can find compact summaries of its key features 
in Hart and Carroll (2013), Amernic, Craig and Tourish (2010), and Murphy (2013). For 
example, Hart (2001, p. 45), the deviser of DICTION, describes DICTION as: 
… a dictionary-based package that examines a text for its verbal tone. It deploys some 10,000 search 
words in 33 word lists. None of these search terms is duplicated in these lists, which allows the user to get 
an usually rich understanding of a sample text. Lying at the heart of the program are five master variables 
[CERTAINTY, OPTIMISM, ACTIVITY, REALISM, and COMMONALITY] that are created by 
combining the subaltern variables. The master variables have been chosen intentionally, the assumption 
being that, if only five questions could be asked of a given passage, these five would provide the most 
robust understanding. 
 
In particular, we compared differences between the DICTION score for the variable 
‘SELF-REFERENCE’ in the 419 email sample and non-419 email sample, using DICTION’s 
“All Norms” dictionary as our normative word-list referent. The variable ‘SELF-
REFERENCE’ is defined as:  
All first-person references, including I, I’d, I’ll, I’m, I’ve, me, mine, my, myself. Self-references are 
treated as acts of indexing whereby the locus of action appears to reside in the speaker and not in the world 
at large thereby implicitly acknowledging the speaker’s limited vision (Hart & Carroll, 2013, p. 6) 
 
Our expectation was that the focus of the SELF-REFERENCE variable on first-person 
references will lead to a very high out-of-normal-range score being recorded for it, consistent 
with our prior contention.1 
 
4. Results  
Table 2 reports the incidence of first-person singular pronouns and first person plural 
pronouns in each analysis group. First person singular pronouns occurred 30.42 times per 
                                                 
1 We note that Onyebadi and Park (2012, p. 181) used DICTION to determine the “main persuasive lexical 
characteristic” of 419 emails. Their study does not seem to reflect a strong understanding of DICTION and the 
interpretations that should be applied defensibly to DICTION scores. In interpreting scores for the five 
DICTION master variables, they seem to ignore that each of these master variables assumes a normal 
distribution around a different mean. Thus, the scores for each should be interpreted in the context of each 
variable’s expected normal distribution. Onyebadi and Park’s (2012) results show that four of the five master 
variables are unremarkable, because they fall within the normal range (of ± 1 s.d.) from the mean expected 
score. The only out-of-range score is for the master variable CERTAINTY, but this is barely out of range. It 
provides no strong pointer to a distinctive semantic tone. The conclusion Onyebadi and Park (2012, p. 181) 
draw is that the language of REALISM or “meeting tangible needs in people’s everyday lives” is the “main 
pervasive lexical characteristic in 419 emails.” In our view, this is misleading. 
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1000 words for the 419 emails, but only 4.41 times per 1000 words for the non-419 emails. 
Thus, the incidence of first person singular pronouns was almost seven times greater in 419 
emails. The proportion of first person singular pronouns to first person plural pronouns was 
63.1% for 419 emails, but only 17.5% for non-419 emails. Thus, the proportion was 3.6 times 
greater in 419 emails. 
Table 2 




(I, I’d, I’ll, me, my, 
mine, myself ) 
Plural 




  n per 1000 n per 1000  
419 emails 10880 331 30.42 193 17.74 63.1% 
       
Non-419 
emails 
6356 28 4.41 132 20.77 17.5% 
 
The last five lines of Appendix B reveal that scores for each of the five DICTION master 
variables (ACTIVITY, OPTIMISM, CERTAINTY, REALISM, COMMONALITY) are all 
within normal range ( ±1 standard deviation from the expected mean). With respect to the 
other 35 DICTION variables, thirteen scores (indicated in bold in Appendix B) fell outside 
the expected normal range. Almost all of these were just outside the normal range. The most 
pronounced out-of-range score was for the dictionary variable SELF-REFERENCE (31.14). 
This occurred in the 419 emails, indicating that use of self-reference words (such as ‘I’, ‘me’, 
‘my’, ‘myself’) was extremely high for this sample. In comparison, the SELF-REFERENCE 
score for the non 419 emails was 0.52, within the normal range. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The findings of our preliminary enquiries draw attention to advance fee fraud or 419-type 
emails being characterised by the following linguistic features: 
1. A much higher proportion of first person singular pronouns than in non-419 emails. 
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2. A much higher proportion (than in non-419 emails) of all first person pronouns being 
singular rather than plural pronouns; and 
3. A DICTION score for the SELF-REFERENCE variable that falls higher than +1 
standard deviation from the expected norm. 
The findings lead to the research question being answered in the affirmative. They 
highlight the potential for overuse of first person singular pronouns to be a linguistic cue to a 
deceptive or fraudulent 419 email. However, clearly, there is much more that can be done to 
improve the identification of 419 emails by analysing the language they employ. For 
example, our findings point to the likely usefulness of the following tentative three-point 
heuristic to identify 419 emails: 
1. There are at least 20 first person singular pronouns per 1000 words. 
2. At least 60% of all first person pronouns are singular. 
3. DICTION’s score for SELF-REFERENCE falls more than + 1 standard deviation from 
the norm (that is, it has a DICTION score higher than 15.10). 
Tentative application of this heuristic to our sampled emails indicates a correct rate of 
identification of 419 emails and non-419 emails of about 80%. There is ample scope to refine 
this heuristic and to conduct stronger empirical testing of it. This could involve, for example, 
a much larger data set, and a data set in which the 419 emails and non-419 emails are more 
closely matched in word length. The heuristic should be tested, too, with stronger regard for 
the type of fraudulent email that it is better at detecting. Our tentative analysis points to the 
heuristic being particularly strong in detecting requests to apply as a foreign beneficiary for 
the transmission of funds, and in respect of appeals to send funds on humanitarian grounds. It 
is less strong in detecting more formal and stylised (but nonetheless fraudulent emails) such 
as those making job offers. 
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While the use of first person singular pronouns is highly suggestive of a 419 email, there 
are several other language issues that can be explored beneficially. For example, at what 
point in the email do self-referential pronouns occur? Are they concentrated for rhetorical 
impact, in the opening and closing sentences? Another beneficial aspect of any forward-
looking research agenda would be to examine whether the decision heuristic we propose (or 
any other classification heuristic, for that matter) is better in detecting scam emails than 
intuitive judgement exercised by a perceptive reader. Thus, further evaluation should be 
directed to compare the classification results obtained using the proposed heuristic with those 
obtained in a laboratory setting by a group of readers who are asked to use intuition to 
classify a carefully selected sample of emails as fraudulent or non-fraudulent.  
References 
Action Fraud. (2010). What is fraud and cyber crime? Accessible at 
http://www.actionfraud.police.uk/what-is-fraud 
Adogame, A. (2009). The 419 code as business unusual: Youth and the unfolding of the 
advance fee fraud online discourse. Asian Journal of Social Science, 37(4), 551-573. 
Amernic, J., Craig, R., & Tourish, D. (2010). Measuring and Assessing Tone at the Top 
Using Annual Report CEO Letters, Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland, 
Edinburgh. 
Blommaert, J., & Omoniyi, T. (2006). Email fraud: Language, technology, and the indexicals 
of globalisation. Social Semiotics, 16(4), 573-605. 
Bond, C.F., & DePaulo, B.M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 214-234. 
Carter, E. (2015). The anatomy of written scam communications: An empirical 
analysis. Crime, Media, Culture, 11, 89-103. 
Chatterjee A., & Bambrick, D.C. (2007). It's all about me: Narcissistic Chief Executive 
Officers and their effects on company strategy and performance. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 52, 351-386. 
Chawki, M. (2009). Nigeria tackles advance free fraud. Journal of Information Law & 
Technology, 1, unpaginated. Accessible at http://go.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/2009_1/chawki 
17 
 
Chang, A. (2014). Linguistic deception cues in selected narrative disclosures contained in 
prospectuses of failed and non-failed New Zealand finance companies. Master’s thesis, 
University of Canterbury, New Zealand, Accessible at 
https://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/handle/10092/8926 
Choo, F., & Tan, K. (2007). An “American Dream” theory of corporate executive fraud. 
Accounting Forum, 31, 203–215. 
Craig, R., Mortensen, T., & Iyer, S. (2013). Exploring top management language for signals 
of possible deception: The words of Satyam’s chair Ramalinga Raju. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 113(2), 333-347. 
Datar, T.D., Cole, K.A., & Rogers, M.K. (2014). Awareness of scam e-mails: an exploratory 
research study. In Proceedings of the Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and 
Law (pp. 11-34). Association of Digital Forensics, Security and Law. Accessible at 
https://search.proquest.com/openview/a29198c9976b91fc1d2cf594e1644a7c/1?pq-
origsite=gscholar&cbl=60415 
Dion, M. (2010). Advance fee fraud letters as Machiavellian/Narcissistic narratives. 
International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 4, 630–642. 
Edelson, E. (2003). The 419 scam: information warfare on the spam front and a proposal for 
local filtering. Computers and Security, 22, pp. 392-401. 
FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation]. (2010). Common fraud schemes. Accessible at 
https://www.fbi.gov/scams-safety/fraud 
Freiermuth, M. (2011a). Text, lies and electronic bait: An analysis of email fraud and the 
decisions of the unsuspecting. Discourse & Communication, 5(2), 123-145. 
Freiermuth, M. (2011b). “This transaction is 100% Risk-Free!” Why do people fall prey to 
email scams? International Conference on Language and Communication (LANCOMM) 
(pp. 222- 230). Accessible at file:///C:/Users/e5028727/Downloads/LANCOMM2011E-
proceeding.pdf 
Garrett, E.V. (2014). Exploring internet users’ vulnerability to online dating fraud: Analysis 
of routine activities theory factors. Master’s thesis. The University of Texas at Dallas. 
Accessible at http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1656449717.html?FMT=ABS. 
Glickman, H. (2005). The Nigerian “419” advance fee scams: prank or peril? Canadian 
Journal of African Studies 39(3), 460-489. 
Gupta, S., & Skillicorn, D. B. (2006). Improving a textual deception detection model. 
In Proceedings of the 2006 conference of the Centre for Advanced Studies on 
Collaborative Research (p. 29). IBM Corp. 
18 
 
Hart, R.P. (2001) Redeveloping DICTION: Theoretical considerations. In M. West (Ed.), 
Theory, Method, and Practice of Computer Content Analysis (pp. 43–60). New York, 
NY: Ablex. 
Hart, R., & Carroll. C.E. (2013). DICTION 7.0. User’s Manual. Digitext, Austin, TX. 
Herley (2012). Why do Nigerian Scammers Say They are from Nigeria? World Economic 
Information Services. Accessible at 
http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2012/papers/Herley_WEIS2012.pdf 
Holt, T.J., & Graves, D. (2007). A qualitative analysis of advance fee fraud email 
schemes. The International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 1, 137-154. 
Humphreys, S.L., Moffitt, K.C., Burns, M.B., Burgoon, J.K., & Felix, W.F. (2011). 
Identification of fraudulent financial statements using linguistic credibility 
analysis. Decision Support Systems, 50, 585-594. 
Hutchings, A., & Hayes, H. (2009). Routine activity theory and phishing victimisation: Who 
gets caught in the net. Current Issues Criminal Justice, 20, 433. 
Kraut, R. (1980). Humans as lie detectors. Journal of communication, 30, 209-218. 
Lamberger, I., Dobovšek, B., & Slak, B. (2013). Analysis of the fraudulent letters AKA 
Nigerian letters. In Proceedings of the Biennial International Conference: Criminal 
Justice and Security–Contemporary Criminal Justice Practice and Research (pp. 443-
466). 
Martin, A.J. (2016). Accountant falls for sexy Nigerian email scammer, gives her £150k he 
cheated out of pal. The Register, 25 October 
(https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/10/25/accountant_defrauded_client_to_rescue_niger
ian_woman_he_met_online/)  
Murphy, A.C. (2013). On “True” Portraits of Letters to Shareholders and the Importance of 
Phraseological Analysis. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics, 18, 57-81.  
Newman, M. L., Pennebaker, J. W., Berry, D. S., & Richards, J. M. (2003).Lying words: 
Predicting deception from linguistic styles. Personality and social psychology 
bulletin, 29(5), 665-675. 
Next Web Security. (2016). 419 Scams - Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud: West African 
Organized Crime Organizations; Detection, Education, Eradication. Accessible at 
https://www.nextwebsecurity.com/ 
Nicolaides, R., Trafford, R., & Craig, R. (2017). ‘Helping Auditors Identify Signs of 
Deception through Psycholinguistics,’ Journal of Financial Crime, in press.  
19 
 
Nykodym, N., & Taylor, R. (2004). The world's current legislative efforts against cyber 
crime. Computer Law & Security Review, 20, 390-395. 
Ofulue, C. I. (2010). A digital forensic analysis of advance fee fraud (419 scams). Handbook 
of Research on Discourse Behavior and Digital Communication: Language Structures 
and Social Interaction: Language Structures and Social Interaction, IGI Global: 
Hershey, PENN, 296. 
Onyebadi, U., & Park, J. (2012). ‘I’m Sister Maria. Please help me’: A lexical study of 4-1-9 
international advance fee fraud email communications. International Communication 
Gazette, 74, 181-199. 
Oriola, T.A. (2005). Advance fee fraud on the Internet: Nigeria’s regulatory 
response. Computer Law & Security Review, 21, 237-248. 
Pennebaker, J.W., Mehl, M.R., & Niederhoffer, K.G. (2003). Psychological aspects of natural 
language use: Our words, our selves. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 547-577. 
Purda, L., & Skillicorn, D. (2015). Accounting variables, deception, and a bag of words: 
Assessing the tools of fraud detection. Contemporary Accounting Research, 32, 1193-
1223. 
Salu, A.O. (2005). Online crimes and advance fee fraud in Nigeria-are available legal 
remedies adequate? Journal of Money Laundering Control, 8, 159-167. 
Schuchter, A., & Levi, M. (2015). Beyond the fraud triangle: Swiss and Austrian elite 
fraudsters. Accounting Forum, 39, 176–187 
The Herald (2017). The life and exploits of Canadian based Nigerian playboy and identity 
thief: Adekunle Johnson ‘Chrome’ Omitiran. Accessible at http://www.herald.ng/life-
exploits-canada-based-nigerian-playboy-identity-thief-adekunle-johnson-chrome-
omitiran/ 
Ultrascan AGI (2014). Examples of 419 E-mail. Accessible at http://www.ultrascan-
agi.com/public_html/html/419_e-mail.html 
Ultrascan AGI (2014). 419 Advance Fee Fraud statistics 2013. Accessible at 
http://www.ultrascan-agi.com/public_html/html/419_statistics.html 
Vartapetiance, A., & Gillam, L. (2012). Deception detection for the tangled web, Computers 
and Society, 42, 34-47. 
Webster, J., & Drew, J. (2017). Experiences of fraud detectives using a victim-focused 
approach. International Journal of Police Science & Management, 9, 39-53. 
20 
 
Zhou, L., Burgoon, J. K., Nunamaker, J. F., & Twitchell, D. (2004). Automating linguistics-
based cues for detecting deception in text-based asynchronous computer-mediated 





Example of a 419 email  
(Source: Ultrascan AGI, 2014) 
 
Dear friend,  
I came to know about you in my private search for a reliable person/company capable to handle a confidential 
establishment of a sister company abroad on behalf of my family and myself. As a matter of fact, I got your 
information from the West African Chamber of Commerce and industry, American Export Promotion Council, 
Eurasia World Trade Journal. 
I am Dr. Kemy Kazy, the son to the former Chairman South Delta Petroleum Development Committee and the 
owner/president of Conja Industries Incorporated. Some Moslem extremist murdered my father immediately he 
publicly condemned the 11th September terrorist attack on World Trade Center in USA. But before he finally 
gave up the ghost, he told me that I should try and invest out side African race. Now my life and that of my 
86yrs old mother are in danger because the Moslems extremists are still after our lives. They have burnt our 
family house and our known properties, freeze our known accounts. So what I want from you is to assist us in 
establishing a sister company in your Country, receiving the fund for the contract in your account overseas so 
that I can come up to your country and live a normal and happy life. We have gone through so many traumatic 
experiences. We are urgently waiting for your response. 
BELOW IS THE COMPANY INTENTED PROJECT. 
This proposal was submitted to you to see if you can be of assistance, represent or help, facilitate the acquisition 
of a viable factory site for Conja intended project in your country. It should be germane to give you a brief 
overview of the company's profile and project as follows:- 
(i) Brief Company Profile: 
Conja Industries Incorporated is involved in the Full trimmings line for the interior decoration sector: tassels, 
tiebacks, cords, braids, fringes, Fire Extinguisher etc. 
(ii) Brief project Description: 
To acquire and establish a permanent branch plant in your country. 
(iii) Purpose: 
To engage in the manufacture of Full trimmings line for the interior and exterior decoration sector/ breakables. 
(iv) The Proposal: 
To establish contact with a representative in the country who must be ordinarily resident in the area of the 
company's interest. The ideal person will function as a contact point for the company towards the procurement 
of a suitable site for the project. The company, as a policy, will pay due compensation upon satisfactory 
completion of the acquisition. 
You will have to consider the advisability of establishing such a project in your country, and a subsequent effort 
in procuring a factory site viz: 
(i)    Minimum of three hectares of land, urban or rural area. 
(ii)   Easily accessible; 
(iii)  Proximity to power grid 
(iv) Proximity to flowing stream or river (optional), 
The project will be funded entirely by the family. All materials and information gathered by you in connection 
to this project are confidential, and considering this letter you agree that no use shall be made of the information 
beyond the terms of your engagement. 
I look forward to working with you on this important project. 












 Variable Low High 419 Value Non-419 Value 
Numerical Terms 0.30 15.04 10.77 14.64 
Ambivalence 6.49 19.21 1.89 9.47 
Self-reference -1.18 15.10 31.14 0.52 
Tenacity 23.32 39.76 23.43 27.50 
Leveling Terms 5.02 12.76 4.30 12.40 
Collectives 4.04 14.46 16.65 6.62 
Praise 2.77 9.59 1.95 4.03 
Satisfaction 0.47 6.09 4.44 5.08 
Inspiration 1.56 11.12 6.35 1.77 
Blame 0.06 4.16 0.34 1.04 
Hardship 1.26 10.48 4.51 0.42 
Aggression 1.07 9.79 6.01 0.79 
Accomplishment 4.96 23.78 10.13 18.89 
Communication 2.21 11.79 5.33 6.50 
Cognition 4.43 14.27 4.34 12.75 
Passivity 2.10 8.08 7.06 4.13 
Spatial Terms 4.17 19.85 21.87 11.21 
Familiarity 117.87 147.19 116.95 109.40 
Temporal Terms 8.36 21.82 13.35 17.38 
Present Concern 7.02 16.66 16.93 14.12 
Human Interest 18.13 45.49 27.34 43.00 
Concreteness 10.70 28.50 27.64 24.79 
Past Concern 0.97 6.19 3.55 2.82 
Centrality 1.18 7.54 2.99 2.27 
Rapport 0.42 4.26 0.48 1.28 
Cooperation 0.36 8.44 5.83 8.42 
Diversity 0.07 3.81 0.10 2.07 
Exclusion -0.03 4.31 2.82 3.12 
Liberation -0.46 4.72 1.69 2.46 
Denial 2.57 10.35 1.88 3.46 
Motion 0.17 4.35 0.19 2.26 
Insistence 9.15 111.15 67.41 40.19 
Embellishment 0.16 1.14 0.16 0.35 
Variety 0.45 0.53 0.52 0.50 
Complexity 4.31 4.91 4.63 4.84 
Activity 46.74 55.48 49.71 49.55 
Optimism 46.37 52.25 51.51 51.53 
Certainty 46.90 51.96 47.01 49.51 
Realism 46.10 52.62 51.52 50.04 
Commonality 46.86 52.28 49.80 49.13 
